Eastern Pact

The Eastern Pact was a Franco-Soviet diplomatic initiative that was discussed from 1933 to 1935. It was imagined as a multilateral defensive treaty, similar in function to the Locarno Treaties, comprising France, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and later Germany. The pact was primarily conceived to prevent a "German attack on the USSR or France". It was initiated by the socialist French foreign Minister Paul-Boncour and it had full Soviet support throughout its creation.

History

Origins

Franco-Soviet relations improved in the years prior to Hitler's victory in Germany. In 1932 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with both France and Poland. This was possible due to the weakening of the German-Soviet Rapallo relationship, the prolongation of which in 1931 (Treaty of Berlin) was the last high note in German-Soviet relations. With the rise of Hitler:

"The Rapallo relationship between Germany and Russia collapsed […]. Germany, the USSR's most important ally in the capitalist world in the 1920s, had become the object of Soviet encirclement and confrontation".

This was also a big hit to the Soviet economy as by 1932 almost half of Soviet imports came from Germany. Hence the Soviet reorientation to France and western powers was the only pragmatic way to avoid diplomatic isolation.

Early Negotiations

Paul-Boncour and Litvinov, the French and Soviet foreign ministers respectively, met in Geneva just as Germany left the League of Nations in October of 1933.

"Secret meetings began to be held immediately, and in spite of early differences, by the end of December the Soviet ambassador was able to present Paul-Boncour with a written draft. This was to form the basis for the negotiations over the Eastern Pact."

A month later the Soviet Union adopted the policy of Collective Security, officially ending the German-Soviet Rapallo relations. One of the main preconditions for the Eastern Pact was the Soviet accession to the League of Nations, which was achieved in September of 1934.

Assassination of Louis Barthou

Because of constant French political crisis, the negotiations stagnated from late 1933 up to the February 9th riots in 1934. Following the riots Paul-Boncour was replaced by Louis Barthou. Unlike Boncour, Barthou wasn't a socialist but rather a conservative patriot whom Carley (2001) describes as a "realist". He continued persuading the Eastern Pact since he recognized Germany as the biggest danger in Europe. The atmosphere around the negotiations, which became public in May 1934 at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, was “positive and encouraging”.

On October 9, less than a month after the Soviet accession into the League of Nations, Barthou was assassinated. He was collateral in the assassination of the Yugoslav King Alexander by an Ustaše-associated Bulgarian fascist, Veličko Kerin, during a state visit to Marseilles. Barthou was succeeded by Pierre Laval which marked the change for worse in Franco-Soviet relations.

The End of the Eastern Pact

Laval, who became a Nazi collaborator in 1940, thought that better relations with the Soviet Union would bring to France “the International and the red flag” and if there were a European war, it would lead to an “invasion of bolshevism”. The latter point was a common anti-communist position dubbed the War-Revolution Nexus. Laval stalled the Eastern Pact negotiations as long as possible. The Soviets, having lost patience, issued a de facto ultimatum to ratify the pact. Litvinov noted in this 'ultimatum' that “Germany, Poland and the Baltic countries could adhere late“. But that would never happen – Poland and Germany were hard pressed to enter any arrangements with the USSR. Laval eventually agreed to the draft in April at Geneva, but really only because Hitler left him no choice considering the rearmament. Indeed, Litvinov would later note that “Hitler's speeches help us a lot“ because their expansionist and revanchist content made them impossible to ignore by French policy makers.

The final form of the pact was significantly weakened. For example, Laval’s promise of staff talks never came to be. Moreover, Litvinov offered quid pro quo guarantees on French eastern frontiers in exchange for French guarantees on Soviet Baltic frontiers; it was all rejected, “blackballed” said one French diplomat.

Back in Paris, Quai d’Orsay senior officials further weakened the language of the pact without Soviet knowledge and sent the draft agreement to the French council of ministers for approval. When the diplomat in Paris, Vladimir Potemkin, discovered the French bad faith, he exploded.

By now the French were starting to be seen as untrustworthy. Dovgalevskii, Potemkin’s predecessor in Paris as ambassador, said that you could never trust the French when it came to an agreement – even in the presence of stenographers. As far as Litvinov goes, he "sometimes fell into cynical despair over the duplicity of French policy".

The Eastern Pact was turned into a simple mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union with a weak backing. It took the French government over a year to ratify it.

A mirror accord was signed with Czechoslovakia a bit later, but the Soviets would support Czechia only if France did so first. That condition was proposed by Beneš, the Czechoslovak president. In conclusion to the Eastern Pact saga, Radice, in her older (1977) but still useful work, says that “much of the blame for the failure of the negotiations can be attributed to the new direction given to French policy by Pierre Laval.”

Retrospective

Logic of the Eastern Pact

Although the Eastern Pact was specifically aimed against German aggression in Europe, Germany was invited into the Eastern Pact as requested by the British. If Germany wasn't invited, she could've validly claimed that she was being encircled. Although Nazi propaganda used that argument anyway, Germany wasn't being encircled since she was allowed to participate in the pact. Had Germany joined and adhered to the Eastern Pact she would be protected from attacks on the same basis as all the other signing countries. Her non-adherence to the pact was a big hindrance to the British to whom Germany's participation was a perquisite for their of the Eastern Pact.

Polish Position

Polish-Soviet relations were messy from the start. Even though the two countries signed a non-aggression pact in 1932 and Poland was seemingly starting to recognize the German threat, its policy was becoming more and more anti-Soviet as time passed. Nominally Poland adhered to a Policy of Equilibrium. Although it didn't participate in any explicit anti-Soviet agreements, its non-aggression pact with Germany in January 1934 contained a secret article which forbade Poland from signing “any agreements without the prior permission of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. Poland had no similar secret agreements with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Poland sabotaged the ratification of the Eastern Pact even though it was persuaded by France, her most important ally. Even Laval put pressure on Beck (the Polish foreign minister) to make his position clearer. Looking at the Polish position logically, signing the Eastern Pact wouldn't be in contradiction with the policy of equilibrium since, as was mentioned above, Germany was also invited. Because of that the treaty wasn't biased towards either side (at least on paper).

War-revolution nexus

Laval’s refusal to engage in healthy relations with the Soviet Union wasn’t specific to Laval. It was based in the idea that a European war would bring communism to Europe. This theory is the so-called "war-revolution nexus", a talking point of most appeasers. One might say that the war-revolution nexus was a exonerated position given our hindsight of the end of World War 2 and the creation of the Eastern Bloc. Ironically though, World War 2 played out in the context of the appeasement policy being implemented to its maximum. In other words, the war-revolution nexus was realized exactly in the context of the "naïve" Anglo-French policy that was supposed to prevent it; a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ of sorts.

Note on Sources

Lisanne Radice (1977) "The Eastern Pact, 1933-1935: A Last Attempt at European Co-operation" is an old text with at least one inaccuracy, that being crediting the Soviets for starting Eastern Pact negotiations, when it was actually Paul-Boncour. Except that, it's one of the most extensive texts that focuses purely on the Eastern Pact. Because of its age, it is advised to use it cautiously when there is no alternative.

Michael Jabara Carley is politically controversial. His works are nonetheless respected among historians, as seen from editorial reviews of his latest book "Stalin's Gamble" (2023). He probably wrote more than any other English speaking historian on pre-war diplomacy.