Editing Eastern Pact (section)

===The End of the Eastern Pact===
Laval, who became a Nazi collaborator in 1940, thought that better relations with the Soviet Union would bring to France “the International and the red flag” and if there were a European war, it would lead to an “invasion of bolshevism”.<ref>Carley (1999) The Alliance That Never Was, 15</ref> The latter point was a common anti-communist position dubbed the '''War-Revolution Nexus'''. Laval stalled the Eastern Pact negotiations as long as possible. The Soviets, having lost patience, issued a ''de facto'' ultimatum to ratify the pact. Litvinov noted in this 'ultimatum' that “Germany, Poland and the Baltic countries could adhere late“.<ref>Library of the President of the Russian Federation, https://prlib.ru/en/node/1297407</ref> But that would never happen – Poland and Germany were hard pressed to enter any arrangements with the USSR.<ref>See Retrospective.</ref> Laval eventually agreed to the draft in April at Geneva, but really only because Hitler left him no choice considering the rearmament.<ref>Carley (2001) Behind Stalin's moustache, 167</ref> Indeed, Litvinov would later note that “Hitler's speeches help us a lot“ because their expansionist and revanchist content made them impossible to ignore by French policy makers.<ref name=":1">Library of the President of the Russian Federation, [https://www.prlib.ru/en/node/1297176 https://prlib.ru/en/node/1297176]</ref> 

The final form of the pact was significantly weakened. For example, Laval’s promise of staff talks never came to be.<ref>Ibid.</ref> Moreover, Litvinov offered ''quid pro quo'' guarantees on French eastern frontiers in exchange for French guarantees on Soviet Baltic frontiers; it was all rejected, “blackballed” said one French diplomat.<ref>Carley (2018) Once Burnt Twice Shy, 8</ref><blockquote>Back in Paris, Quai d’Orsay<ref>The street name referring to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, similar to how 10 Downing Street refers to the British Prime Minister.</ref> senior officials further weakened the language of the pact without Soviet knowledge and sent the draft agreement to the French council of ministers for approval. When the diplomat in Paris, Vladimir Potemkin, discovered the French bad faith, he exploded.<ref>Ibid., 9</ref></blockquote>By now the French were starting to be seen as untrustworthy. Dovgalevskii, Potemkin’s predecessor in Paris as ambassador, said that you could never trust the French when it came to an agreement – even in the presence of stenographers.<ref>Carley (2015) Who Betrayed Whom?, 8</ref> As far as Litvinov goes, he "sometimes fell into cynical despair over the duplicity of French policy".<ref>Carley (1999) The Alliance That Never Was, 17</ref> 

The Eastern Pact was turned into a simple mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union with a weak backing. It took the French government over a year to ratify it. 

A mirror accord was signed with Czechoslovakia a bit later, but the Soviets would support Czechia only if France did so first.<ref>Ibid.</ref> That condition was proposed by Beneš, the Czechoslovak president.<ref>Roberts (1995) The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War, 49</ref> In conclusion to the Eastern Pact saga, Radice, in her older (1977) but still useful work, says that “much of the blame for the failure of the negotiations can be attributed to the new direction given to French policy by Pierre Laval.”<ref>Radice (1977) The Eastern Pact, 45</ref>